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Social identity, the part of the self-concept derived from group membership, is a
key explanatory construct for a wide variety of behaviors, ranging from organizational
commitment to discrimination toward out-groups. Using functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI), we examined the neural basis of social identity through a comparison with
the neural correlates of self-face perception. Participants viewed a series of pictures, one
at a time, of themselves, a familiar other, in-group members, and out-group members. We
created a contrast for self-face perception by subtracting brain activation in response to
the familiar other from brain activation in response to the self face, and a contrast for social
identity by subtracting brain activation in response to out-group faces from brain activation
in response to in-group faces. In line with previous research, for the self—familiar other
contrast we found activation in several right-hemisphere regions (inferior frontal gyrus,
inferior and superior parietal lobules). In addition, we found activation in closely-adjacent
brain areas for the social identity contrast. Importantly, significant clusters of activation in
this in-group—out-group contrast only emerged to the extent that participants reported
high identification with the in-group. These results suggest that self-perception and social
identity depend on partly similar neural processes.
Keywords: social identity, functional neuroimaging, self-perception, group identification
Social identity theory maintains that a person’s self-concept
consists of two parts: The personal self and the social self (Tajfel
and Turner, 1979; Ellemers and Haslam, 2012). The social self,
or “social identity,” is the part of identity derived from group
membership (e.g., as “Female,” a “Red Sox-fan,” a “European,” a
“Lefthander,” or “Catholic,” Tajfel and Turner, 1979). Social iden-
tity is a key explanatory construct for a wide variety of group
behaviors, ranging from organizational commitment to discrim-
ination against out-groups (Ellemers and Haslam, 2012). More
generally, social identification with groups serves core human
needs for belonging, social meaning, and self-esteem, and has
important health consequences as it can form a buffer against
pain and stress (Branscombe et al., 1999; Spears et al., 2004;
Brewer, 2007; Hogg, 2009; Fiske, 2010; Jetten et al., 2011).
At the conceptual level, social identity has been described in
terms of overlapping mental representations of self and in-group
(Smith and Henry, 1996; Tropp and Wright, 2001; Otten and
Epstude, 2006; Swann et al., 2009). In the current research we
tested a novel prediction derived from this view, namely that
when people see in-group faces, this activates similar brain areas
as when people see their own face. Assuming that the personal self
and social identity rely partly on comparable processes (Devos
and Banaji, 2003), we hypothesized that similar brain areas are
involved in defining and perceiving the self at the personal and
the group level. However, because there are substantial differences
in the extent to which people derive part of their identity from
a particular group membership, we expect the activation of self-
relevant brain areas in response to in-group faces to emerge as
a function of the extent to which the person identifies with the
in-group.
THE NEURAL BASIS OF VISUAL SELF-FACE PERCEPTION
In the past two decades, researchers have started to examine the
neural basis of self-perception and self-awareness (see Lieberman,
2007, for an overview). An important strand of research within
this area has focused on the neural correlates of self-face percep-
tion (Uddin et al., 2007; Platek et al., 2008; Devue and Brédart,
2011). In this research, participants typically view pictures of
their own face and faces of familiar others (e.g., a friend or
spouse) while brain activation is assessed using functional mag-
netic resonance imaging (fMRI). Compared to pictures of famil-
iar others, pictures of the self typically activate a bilateral, but
right-dominant, network (Keenan et al., 2001; Platek et al., 2004;
Uddin et al., 2005; Lieberman, 2007; Sui andHan, 2007; see Platek
et al., 2008, for meta-analytic evidence).
A recent overview of the literature (Devue and Brédart, 2011)
indicated two regions of the right hemisphere that have been
most frequently reported in fMRI research on self-face percep-
tion: The right inferior frontal gyrus and a right parietal network
including the inferior and superior parietal lobule. This latter area
seems to be particularly important for the perception of the self
as a distinct entity (Uddin et al., 2005, 2007). Indeed, repetitive
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transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) evidence indicates that
a “virtual lesion” in the right (but not the left) inferior parietal
lobule disrupts the ability to make distinctions between self and
other (Uddin et al., 2006).
SOCIAL IDENTITY AND ITS NEURAL SUBSTRATES
Just as making distinctions between “self” and “other” (personal
distinctiveness) forms the basis of the personal self, making dis-
tinctions between “us” and “them” (inter-group distinctiveness)
forms the basis of social identity. More specifically, social iden-
tity theory is based on three principles: social categorization,
social comparison, and social identity (Tajfel and Turner, 1979;
Ellemers and Haslam, 2012). The theory starts with the notion
that people categorize themselves and others as in-group and out-
group members., In-group membership derives social meaning
via social comparison of the in-group with the out-group, for
example as a function of the social status of the group. This then
yields “social identity,” namely the knowledge of group member-
ship as a part of self, and the value and emotional significance
attached to this (Tajfel and Turner, 1979). Thus, similar to the per-
sonal self, social identity contains both descriptive and evaluative
aspects. The main difference between the personal self and social
identity is that the social identity forms a higher, more inclu-
sive, level of self-definition (Turner et al., 1987). Social-cognitive
research has confirmed that similar principles underlie both levels
of self-definition (Devos and Banaji, 2003; Volz et al., 2009).
As indicated above, while a sense of personal distinctiveness
forms an important basis for a sense of (personal) self, group dis-
tinctiveness forms the basis for social identity. However, whereas
personal distinctiveness is inherently present in healthy individ-
uals by means of bodily distinctiveness from others, there is
substantial variation in the extent to which people see the in-
group as a clearly distinct entity (Spears et al., 2002). For example,
while some left-handers see their in-group as clearly different
from the out-group (right-handers), other left-handers do not
have such a differentiated view of their in-group (e.g., in terms of
the broader personality and other characteristics of its members),
and see substantial overlap with the out-group. The tendency to
have a clearly differentiated view of the in-group (vis-à-vis the
out-group) is a direct function of the degree to which people
identify with the group (Castano et al., 2002; Spears et al., 2004).
That is, group identification forms the bridge between the in-
group and the self (Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Deaux, 1996; Ellemers
et al., 1999). Therefore, we expect that only people who identify
strongly with an in-group activate similar brain areas when they
see in-group faces and when they see their own face.
Previous neuroscience research has examined the affective and
behavioral consequences of social identity, for example how the
neural reward system responds to winning and losing an inter-
group competition (Cikara et al., 2011). Moreover, research has
also examined the neural substrates of in-group bias (i.e., the
tendency to see one’s group in a particularly positive light), a
phenomenon that is closely related to the establishment of a pos-
itive social identity (Van Bavel et al., 2008; Volz et al., 2009).
Research in the latter area has mainly focused on activation of
the amygdala, which signals the motivational relevance of a stim-
ulus. Research has indeed shown greater amygdala activation to
in-group than to out-group faces (Van Bavel et al., 2008; Wright
et al., 2008; cf. Hart et al., 2000).
Previous research has also examined the influence of racial
identification (Mathur et al., 2012) and group identification
(Molenberghs and Morrison, 2013) on neural responses to in-
group and out-group stimuli. Mathur et al. report a relationship
between racial identification and the activation of the “default
network” (which is implied in self-reflection) when viewing
in-group (as opposed to out-group) pictures. Moreover, in a
study involving inter-group competition between two artificially-
created groups (“minimal groups”), Molenberghs and Morrison
found a relationship between group identification and activa-
tion of the medial prefrontal cortex, an area that has been
implied in a variety of socio-cognitive processes, including the self
(Lieberman, 2007). In the current work we build on this previous
research, but make a direct comparison between neural activ-
ity related to the perception of the self-face, and neural activity
related to the perception of in-group faces.
THE CURRENT RESEARCH
As a starting point in the current research, we adapted a paradigm
from research on self-face perception (Platek et al., 2004; Uddin
et al., 2005), which we adapted by adding an inter-group dimen-
sion. While in the scanner, participants viewed pictures of them-
selves, a familiar other (friend), in-group members (students
from Leiden University) and out-group members (students from
the VU University Amsterdam). We expected that participants
would differ in the strength of identification with their own
university. Furthermore, by using university affiliation as cate-
gorization criterion rather than highly visible categories such as
ethnicity, gender, or age, we could control for the physical char-
acteristics of in-group and out-group targets. In the year the
research was conducted (2011) the two universities were also
quite close to each other in the Times Higher Education World
University Ranking (Leiden: 54.4 points, 124th position; VU: 52.3
points, 139th position). The universities are also quite similar in
size (Leiden: 19.000 students; VU: 18.000 students) and study
profile, having strengths in similar areas of research and teaching
(natural sciences, social sciences, humanities, medicine, law). In
summary, the current context was ideal for studying basic social
identity processes in a still realistic inter-group context.
METHOD
PARTICIPANTS
Forty-one right-handed male Leiden University students
(Mage = 21) participated in return for C20. Participants pro-
vided informed consent according to the ethical guidelines of the
Leiden University Medical Center.
STIMULI
Participants viewed grayscale images of their own face (presented
as in a picture), the face of a familiar other male student, and
faces of 14 Caucasian male students (7 in-group, 7 out-group).
All faces bore a neutral expression and eyes were directed at
the camera. Based on a pretest (N = 47) of a larger sample
of 36 pictures that were rated on attractiveness, we selected 14
pictures of average attractiveness. The assignment of pictures
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to the in- and out-group was pseudo-randomized over partici-
pants. Before the experiment, we checked whether participants
were unfamiliar with in-group and out-group faces and replaced
pictures of familiar faces with unfamiliar ones.
PROCEDURE
The study consisted of two sessions. In the first session partici-
pants were asked to bring a male Leiden student that they knew
reasonably well1. We took pictures of both students and measured
their identification with Leiden University using five items (e.g.,
“I feel a bondwith Leiden students”; “I have a lot in commonwith
other Leiden students”; α = 0.85).
In a second session, before they went into the scanner, par-
ticipants were asked to memorize the university affiliation of
fourteen, as yet unfamiliar, male students: 7 in-group members
and 7 out-group members. In the presentation phase the pic-
tures of these 14 students were presented in random order on
a computer screen; below each picture the university affiliation
of the person was indicated (see Figure 1A). The sequence of
14 pictures was presented five times. After viewing the pictures,
participants were tested on their ability to classify the pictures
according to university affiliation. In this testing phase, all 14 pic-
tures were again presented randomly in sequence, but this time
without university labels (see Figure 1B). The participant’s task
was to indicate the university affiliation of the person on the pic-
ture, with the index and middle fingers of his right hand making
use of two keys on the keyboard (counterbalanced across par-
ticipants). After each response the participant received feedback
about the correctness of his response. To make sure that every
participant would be able to categorize the previously unfamiliar
students during the subsequent, critical phase of the study, we set
a fixed learning criterion: The complete sequence of 14 pictures
had to be flawlessly categorized twice. Again, the stimuli were pre-
sented in series of 14 (comprising all stimuli). After a mistake,
the sequence was first completed after which a new one started.
This procedure was repeated until the participant completed two
subsequent series correctly, after which he proceeded to the next
phase, which took place in the scanner.
Once in the scanner, participants were presented with the pic-
ture of themselves and their familiar other, and with the pictures
of in-group targets and out-group targets, in random order (see
Figure 2). They were asked to indicate the university affiliation
of the in-group (UL) and out-group (VU) targets by pressing
a corresponding button with the middle or index finger (coun-
terbalanced across participants, but the same button-university
combinations as in training phase) of their right hand. Although
the response options were displayed along with each stimulus (see
Figure 2), participants were explicitly asked not to respond to the
pictures of themselves and their familiar other. During this phase,
participants did not receive performance feedback.
1In order to isolate activation associated with self-face perception, and to
exclude any activation associated with social identity, we created a con-
trast between self and a familiar other who shared the social identity that
was relevant for the ingroup-outgroup contrast (university affiliation). That
is, subtracting activation related to social identity in the self-familiar other
contrast yields the purest activation for self-face perception.
We used an event-related design, in which stimuli were coun-
terbalanced over 3 runs of 84 stimuli each. Per run each stimulus
type (self, familiar other, in-group and out-group) was presented
21 times, for 5 s each time. Thus, each individual in-group/out-
group target was presented three times per run, nine times in
total. Pictures of self and familiar other were each presented 63
times across the experiment, so BOLD activity may have shown
some habituation (Wedig et al., 2005). Stimuli were preceded by
a fixation cross with a variable presentation time (580–7460ms).
Participants were instructed to think about the person in the
picture, for the full 5 s that the picture was shown. For in-group
and out-group members, the participant was also instructed to
indicate the person’s university affiliation. After responding, the
picture remained on the screen until the full 5 s had passed. These
(verbally delivered) task instructions were repeated before the
start of runs two and three.
As will be described inmore detail in the next section, we oper-
ationalized self-face perception in terms of a contrast between
self and familiar other (e.g., Uddin et al., 2005; Sui and Han,
2007). Social identity was operationalized in terms of a contrast
between in-group and out-group, to which we added in-group
identification as a covariate.
It should be noted that there are two important differ-
ences between the contrasts we created for self-face perception
and social identity. First, in-group and out-group stimuli were
explicitly categorized during the picture viewing task, while self
and familiar other stimuli were not categorized. We required
responses to in-group/out-group stimuli for two reasons: (1) To
make sure participants kept on responding (e.g., they didn’t fall
asleep during a run); and (2) To be able to control for the num-
ber of errors participants made when categorizing in-group and
out-group members in our analyses. Although we could safely
assume that, especially in the absence of time pressure, people
would immediately and correctly recognize pictures of themselves
and their familiar other, we incorporated an additional check to
verify that this was also the case for the (previously unfamiliar)
in-group and out-group members. The motor activity associated
with the responses to in-group and out-group stimuli (performed
with adjacent fingers of the same hand) was essentially eliminated
in the contrast comparing the in-group—out-group conditions.
In addition, there may have emerged some neural activity asso-
ciated with response inhibition in the self and familiar other
conditions. That is, as indicated above, the possible response
cues (left and right button options) from the in-group/out-group
conditions were also displayed in the self and familiar other con-
ditions, although the participant was explicitly instructed not to
categorize these stimuli. Importantly, however, the inhibition of
responses that may have been required when perceiving self and
familiar other stimuli was also eliminated in the contrast com-
paring the self and familiar other conditions. Therefore, there was
no confound in terms of motor activity or response inhibition
between the contrasts for self-face perception and social identity.
The second, important, difference between the self-face per-
ception and social identity contrasts concerns the addition of
group identification as a covariate to the in-group—out-group
contrast. As explained in the introduction, there is substantial
variability in the extent to which people identify with, and thus
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FIGURE 1 | (A) Example of five screens in the presentation phase of the
learning task that was performed outside of the scanner. Participants
passively viewed and were instructed to memorize targets of their in-group (7
males Leiden University students) and their out-group (7 males VU University
Amsterdam students). The university affiliation of each target appeared at the
bottom of the screen. Screens appeared in complete sequences of all 14
targets (targets were presented in random order within each sequence). This
sequence was presented 5 times. (B) Example of five trials in the testing
phase of the learning task that was performed outside of the scanner.
Participants were presented with targets of their in-group (7 males Leiden
University students) or of their out-group (7 males VU University Amsterdam
students) and had to indicate the university affiliation of each target (VU = VU
University Amsterdam; UL = Leiden University). Trials appeared in complete
sequences of all 14 targets (targets were presented in random order within
each sequence). The testing phase ended when participants had flawlessly
categorized all 14 targets in two subsequent sequences.
FIGURE 2 | Example of two trials of the task participants performed in
the scanner. Participants were presented with a picture of themselves, a
familiar other, an ingroup or outgroup member. Although the group names
appeared at the bottom of the screen for all picture types (VU = VU
University Amsterdam; UL = Leiden University), participants’ task was to
respond only when a picture of an ingroup or outgroup members was
presented. Target pictures stayed on the screen for 5 s, even after
participants had responded.
derive part of their identity from, a particular group member-
ship (not least because there are many different groups to which
we belong, and many not out of choice). Note that this is in
stark contrast to a sense of personal self, which is always to
some extent present in healthy individuals. According to our
rationale, in-group stimuli should only trigger social-identity-
relevant brain responses to the extent that the person identifies
with the group. Therefore, we took the variation in in-group iden-
tification into account when examining the social identity (i.e.,
in-group—out-group) contrast.
MRI IMAGE ACQUISITION AND ANALYSES
Images were collected with a 3-T Philips Achieva MRI scanner.
Anatomical images were collected using a T1-weighted sequence
(TR = 9.8ms, TE = 4.59ms, flip angle = 8◦, 64 ∗ 64 matrix,
140 slices, 0.875 × 0.875 × 1.2mm). Visual stimuli were pro-
jected onto a screen that was viewed through a mirror at the
head end of the magnet. Functional images were reconstructed
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org September 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 528 | 4
Scheepers et al. Self- and in-group face perception
from 38 transverse slices acquired using a T2∗-weighted EPI
sequence (TR = 2.2 s, TE = 30ms, flip angle = 80◦, 2.75 ×
2.75 × 2.75mm + 10% inter-slice gap). Image acquisition varied
across trials with respect to stimulus onset, yielding an effectively
higher temporal sampling rate. Three functional runs of 346 scans
each were collected.
Data were preprocessed and analyzed with SPM8 (Wellcome
Department of Cognitive Neurology, London). Functional images
were motion-corrected using rigid-body realignment and then
corrected for differences in timing of slice acquisition. The max-
imum amount of motion observed was 2mm (in any direction).
Each T1-weighted structural MR image was co-registered with
the corresponding mean functional MR image and then seg-
mented and spatially normalized to the Montreal Neurological
Institute (MNI) reference brain template. Next, slice-timing- and
motion-corrected functional images were normalized according
to the same parameters and smoothed with a 8-mm full width at
half-maximum Gaussian kernel.
For each participant, the blood oxygen-level dependent
(BOLD) responses across the scanning run were modeled with
a general linear model including four explanatory variables
(box-car regressors with 5 s duration) that corresponded with
the four experimental conditions: self, familiar other, in-group,
and out-group. The explanatory variables were convolved with
a canonical hemodynamic response function (HRF). In addi-
tion, the linear model included as regressors-of-no-interest
session/subject-effects, errors (if any, M = 4.5, SD = 4.1, range
0–13), realignment parameters, and a temporal high-pass fil-
ter (1/128Hz) to account for various low-frequency effects. For
each voxel and each explanatory variable, a parameter esti-
mate was generated that indicated the strength of covariance
between the data and the HRF; these estimates were corrected
for temporal autocorrelation using a first-order autoregressive
model. Contrasts between parameter estimates for different con-
ditions were calculated for each participant, and the results
submitted to a group analysis that treated inter-subject vari-
ability as a random effect. In addition, for the group analyses
of the in-group—out-group contrast, the participants’ in-group
identification scores were added as a covariate in the analy-
sis. SPM8 automatically orthogonalized this parametric regressor
with regard to themain trial regressor. Statistical parametric maps
were derived from the resulting t-values associated with each
voxel.
We analyzed the data in two steps. As a first step, we per-
formed whole-brain analyses to search for self-related brain areas.
Specifically, we sought to identify brain areas sensitive to self-
face perception and areas sensitive to in-group—out-group dis-
tinction, as a function of group identification (social identity).
Therefore, we examined the self—familiar other contrast and the
in-group—out-group X identification contrast, with a thresh-
old of p < 0.0005 (uncorrected) and a contiguity threshold of
20 voxels as a precaution against type-1 errors (Lieberman and
Cunningham, 2009). To interpret the peaks of activation clus-
ters we used the WFU Pickatlas (Maldjian et al., 2003, 2004).
The self—familiar other and in-group—out-group X identifi-
cation contrasts revealed that self- and in-group faces activated
several closely adjacent areas in the right hemisphere. As a
second step, we attempted to statistically support this impres-
sion. To this end we created spheres with an 8-mm radius around
the peaks of activation clusters in the in-group—out-group X
identification contrast. Then, we tested whether these regions
contained voxel clusters that were more activated by self than
by familiar other, using a small-volume correction (p < 0.05,
cluster-corrected).
RESULTS
BEHAVIORAL DATA
During the learning phase, group identification was negatively
related to accuracy in categorizing in-group targets (r = −0.41,
p = 0.008). This replicates previous research on in-group over-
exclusion (Castano et al., 2002) and shows that those who
identify relatively strongly with their group are more cautious
when including people in their in-group, leading them to ini-
tially classify more targets as out-group-members. Importantly,
identification was not related to the number of series partici-
pants needed to see to learn to categorize in-group and out-
group stimuli flawlessly during the learning phase (r = 0.03);
therefore, identification was unrelated to the frequency with
which participants had seen the stimuli before going into the
scanner.
In the scanner all participants were able to correctly cate-
gorize in-group and out-group faces (Macc = 0.96, SD = 0.03;
minimum accuracy = 0.90). There were no differences for
accuracy and response latencies between the different stimulus
types (Maccin−group = 0.96, Maccout−group = 0.97, Mrtin−group =
1257.6ms,Mrtout−group = 1257.8ms; all pairwise t-scores< 0.61,
all p > 0.54, see Figure 3). Finally, identification was not related
FIGURE 3 | Behavioral responses in the scanner: mean accuracy (top
panel) and response times (RT; lower panel) while participants
categorized in-group and out-group targets.
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to how quickly or correctly participants responded to individual
in-group and out-group targets (all r’s < 0.13, all p > 0.42).
fMRI DATA
Replicating previous studies on self-face perception (Platek et al.,
2008), the self—familiar other contrast revealed a bilateral, but
right-dominated, pattern of activation in frontal, parietal and
occipital regions (see Table 1 and Figure 4). This included strong
activation in the regions that have been most frequently reported
in fMRI research on self-face perception: the right inferior frontal
gyrus and the right inferior and superior parietal lobule (Devue
and Brédart, 2011).
The in-group—out-group X identification contrast yielded
significant clusters of activation in the right inferior frontal gyrus,
the right inferior and superior parietal lobule and left lingual
gyrus (see Table 2): in all four areas, participants with higher
identification scores showed increased activation to in-group
members compared to out-groupmembers. As noted above, these
first three areas are the most frequently reported areas in fMRI
research on self-face perception (Devue and Brédart, 2011).
Figure 5 shows a striking pattern: three of the four areas acti-
vated in the in-group—out-group X identification contrast are
closely adjacent to (but not overlapping with) activation clusters
in the self—familiar other contrast. To statistically confirm this
impression, we created spheres with an 8-mm radius around the
activation peak in each of these clusters of activation in each of the
in-group—out-group X identification contrasts, and then exam-
ined these spheres for voxels that were activated more by self than
by familiar other.
This yielded significant clusters of activation in all three
right-hemisphere regions: the right inferior frontal gyrus
(pcluster−corrected = 0.003; peak coordinates: 50, 8, 34; t = 4.50),
the right inferior parietal lobule (pcluster−corrected = 0.008; peak
coordinates: 40, −40, 42; t = 3.71), and the right superior pari-
etal lobule (pcluster−corrected = 0.016; peak coordinates: 26, −72,
46; t = 3.72). A similar analysis for activation in the left lingual
gyrus, not a typical self-relevant area, did not show any significant
results.
We also examined the in-group—out-group contrast without
the covariate of group identification. In line with our assump-
tion that in-group/out-group distinctions are only meaningful
to the degree that one identifies with the in-group, this did
not yield any significant activation. Finally, we tested all of
the reverse contrasts. The out-group—in-group contrast and
the interaction with in-group identification did not reveal any
significant activation. The familiar other—self contrast revealed
significant clusters of activation in the right medial frontal gyrus,
the right middle temporal gyrus, right precuneus, and the right
fusiform gyrus (Table 3).
DISCUSSION
The current research shows that people who identify highly
with an in-group activate closely adjacent brain areas when they
see faces of in-group members and when they see their own
face. These closely adjacent brain areas for self and in-group
were observed in the most frequently reported areas in previous
research on self-face perception: the right inferior frontal gyrus
Table 1 | Coordinates and peak activation statistics for clusters in
self-familiar other contrast.
Region Coordinates
k x y z T
Right inferior, middle frontal gyrus 455 48 42 8 6.85
Right inferior frontal gyrus 467 50 8 22 5.38
Right inferior frontal gyrus 49 40 26 16 4.23
Left inferior, middle frontal gyrus 184 −50 4 32 4.77
Left inferior frontal gyrus 82 −46 46 8 4.29
Right parietal cortex including
superior and inferior parietal
lobule, precuneus
857 30 −62 50 4.65
Right postcentral gyrus 53 54 −24 40 4.21
Left inferior parietal lobule 43 −42 −38 48 4.00
Left precuneus 49 −24 −68 42 3.89
Right occipital and temporal
cortex
2649 44 −64 −10 6.98
Left occipital and temporal cortex 1073 −34 −60 −4 5.74
k, number of voxels in cluster. Coordinates (x, y, z) refer to Montreal neurological
institute stereotaxic space (MNI).
FIGURE 4 | Significant activations for self vs. familiar-other contrast,
thresholded at p < 0.0005, with a contiguity threshold of 20
voxels. Activations are shown on an individual brain rendered in 3D.
Table 2 | Coordinates and peak activation statistics for clusters in
in-group—out-group contrast, predicted by identification.
Region Coordinates
k x y z T
Right inferior frontal gyrus 21 46 8 40 4.05
Right inferior parietal lobule 73 40 −46 38 4.67
Right superior parietal lobule 40 30 −78 44 4.08
Left lingual gyrus 42 −12 −64 −6 4.20
k, number of voxels in cluster. Coordinates (x, y, z) refer to Montreal neurological
institute stereotaxic space (MNI).
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FIGURE 5 | Activation in closely adjacent areas in self—familiar
contrast (blue) and in-group—out-groupX identification contrast (red).
Both contrasts are thresholded at p < 0.0005, with a contiguity threshold
of 20 voxels. Images are in neurological format (right = right).
Table 3 | Coordinates and peak activation statistics for clusters in
familiar other—self contrast.
Region Coordinates
k x y z T
Right medial frontal gyrus 33 4 54 −14 4.49
Right middle temporal gyrus 254 54 −16 −10 4.88
Right precuneus 353 6 −54 32 5.62
Right fusiform gyrus 103 54 −2 −30 5.20
k, number of voxels in cluster. Coordinates (x, y, z) refer to Montreal neurological
institute stereotaxic space (MNI).
and several regions in the right parietal cortex (i.e., the infe-
rior parietal lobule and superior parietal lobule; see Platek et al.,
2008; Devue and Brédart, 2011). It has been shown that these
right parietal areas are crucial for making visual self-other dis-
tinctions, a primary factor in the development of self -awareness
(Uddin et al., 2007). In our study, group identification was posi-
tively related to activation in these same areas when participants
made in-group—out-group distinctions, which is the first step in
social identity definition.
Because we used (previously) unfamiliar individuals as in-
group and out-group stimuli, and randomized the group mem-
bership of these individuals between participants, the larger brain
responses to in-group members than to out-group members can-
not be explained in terms of familiarity or similarity in facial
features. In addition, high and low identifiers did not differ in the
number of trials needed to learn the in-group/out-group catego-
rization, suggesting that differences in brain activation cannot be
explained in terms of more/less exposure to the in-group and out-
group faces, or other characteristics of the task. That is, although
after some practice all participants were able to perform rea-
sonably well on the categorization task, the neural activations
underlying these categorizations differed in a meaningful way as
a function of in-group identification.
A possible explanation for the activations we found in the
right parietal cortex is that self-faces and in-group faces may have
drawn more attention than faces of the familiar other and out-
group members. Indeed, it has been demonstrated that the right
parietal cortex is involved in attentional processes (Manly et al.,
2003). This explanation would be perfectly in keeping with the
notion that “attention to the self” forms an important component
of self-consciousness (Decety and Sommerville, 2003). However,
we are cautious to draw definitive conclusions about the role of
attention in the current results as we did not observe signifi-
cant differences in reaction times when categorizing in-group and
out-group members.
An important finding is that although self-face perception and
social identity yielded activation in closely adjacent brain areas,
these areas did not overlap. In retrospect this may be explained
by the notion that, in the end, self and in-group are different
entities, even though they are based on partly similar processes.
Nevertheless, the striking similarity in the pattern of activation
raises the question whether the concepts of self and social iden-
tity are represented in a common domain of category-specific
semantic organization (Mahon and Caramazza, 2009). That is,
representations of self and in-group may share an evolutionarily
relevant history (Brewer, 2007), which has been proposed as an
important basis for conceptual organization in the brain (Mahon
and Caramazza, 2009).
We did not find any significant activation in the in-group—
out-group contrast without inclusion of in-group identification
as a covariate. This is in keeping with our assumption that the
perception of in-group members should only lead to social-
identity-relevant brain activation for those who see the group
as an important part of their self-concept or identity. At the
same time, this finding may seem at odds with previous research
showing brain activation in an in-group—out-group contrast
without controlling for identification (e.g., Hart et al., 2000;
Van Bavel et al., 2008; Wright et al., 2008; Cikara et al., 2011).
However, these previous studies were either conducted in the
context of an inter-group competition (Van Bavel et al., 2008;
Cikara et al., 2011), which typically increases in-group iden-
tification, or involved social categories that are directly visible
and therefore more or less chronically salient (e.g., racial, age
or gender groups; Hart et al., 2000; Wright et al., 2008). In the
current non-competitive and rather “minimal” inter-group con-
text, using previously unfamiliar in-group members as stimuli,
the absence of activation in the in-group—out-group contrast
without controlling for identification is perhaps less surprising.
Although social categorization (i.e., making the distinction
between “us” and “them”), forms the basis of social identity, we
do not want to suggest that the brain activation associated with
this process can fully capture such a complex phenomenon as
“social identity.” As is the case for the personal self-concept (e.g.,
self-reflection, self-esteem), social identity has different aspects,
which most likely involve different, bilateral, neural networks
(Lieberman, 2007; Uddin et al., 2007). In relation to this, social
identity can be made salient by exemplars of the in-group, as in
the current research, but also by traits, group names, symbols, etc.
(Morrison et al., 2012). At a more abstract level, apart from face
perception, (social) identity can also be developed and activated
through other modalities such as words or traits related to cer-
tain groups, sound (speech with a certain accent) or even smell
(Coppin et al., under review). Nonetheless, visual face-perception
is an important source for early social categorization processes
in day-to-day life and can set in motion important psychological
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processes, such as stereotypes and social identity, that in turn
affect human interactions.
Finally, it is important to note that in the current work
we solely focused on a basic cognitive component of social
identity, namely in-group face perception. However, social-
categorization—and the social identity it provides—is closely
intertwined with emotion and motivation (Tajfel and Turner,
1979). Indeed, previous research has shed light on how the neural
reward system responds to in-group success and out-group failure
(Cikara et al., 2011), and how social categorization relates to the
neural correlates of in-group bias (Van Bavel et al., 2008). Rather
than examining the consequences of social identity, we examined
social identity in its most basic cognitive sense, in terms of in-
group—out-group distinctions, and drew a parallel with the per-
sonal self-concept in its most basic sense, in terms of self—other
distinctions (Uddin et al., 2007). Future research should exam-
ine how the different aspects of social identity relate to different
networks in the brain, and how these networks interactively
shape inter-group behavior (e.g., discrimination), and related
important outcome variables such as collective self-esteem.
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